Abstract Title : Secure Auctions (90 minutes)
Auctions are arguably now the single most important form of electronic commerce. What security properties are important for auctions? Is the security of existing auction methods acceptable? I will discuss these issues, and show an example of an auction method that simultaneously achieves computational efficiency, economic efficiency, and supports (secure) private bidding.
Doug Tygar is a Professor of Computer Science and Information Management at the University of California, Berkeley, where he conducts research in electronic commerce, computer security, and privacy. He also holds a faculty appointment (on leave) in the Computer Science Department at Carnegie Mellon University, where he taught from 1986 to 1998. Doug Tygar's honors include a NSF Presidential Young Investigator award, several best-paper awards, serving on the National Academy of Science/National Research Council's Committee on Information Trustworthiness, serving on the INFOSEC Research Council's Information Security Science and Technology Study Group, and being named as a "favorite professor" by Carnegie Mellon Magazine. He has helped designed a number of major systems, including the NetBill electronic commerce system, and Cryptographic Postage Indicia (which the US Postal Service has adopted as its new Information Based Indicia Program standard.) He consults widely for industry and government. You can read more details about Doug Tygar and his research from his web page http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~tygar.
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