

COMPUTER SCIENCE SEMINAR SERIES

Department of Computer Science
City University of Hong Kong
(Departmental Seminar Seminar 2006/2007 - No 62)

Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

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Date :

27 June 2007 (Wednesday)

Time :

11:00am-12:00noon

Venue :

CS Seminar Room, Rm Y6405, 6th Floor Yellow Zone, Academic Building, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong.

Abstract

The topic of this seminar is on a paper the presenter has co-authored. In this paper, we formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number of sales.

This paper will be presented in the 13th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2007), July 16-19, 2007.

Supervisor: Prof. Xiaotie Deng (CS)

Research Interests: Auction, Computational Economics, Electronic Commerce

All are welcome!

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In case of questions, please contact Prof Xiaotie Deng at Tel: 2788 8632, E-mail: csdeng@cityu.edu.hk, or visit the CS Departmental Seminar Web at <http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/>.